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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
1986 Red Toyota 4-Runner 
bearing VIN JT4RN620G0057623, Case No, 900150 
Defendant/Respondent. : 
Brief of Appellant 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
1. Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court 
to hear this appeal by Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3) (j) (1953, as 
amended). 
2. This appeal is brought by Plaintiff pursuant to Rule 
3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, A forfeiture action 
was filed by the State of Utah in the Second Judicial District 
Court of Utah in an in rem proceeding against one 1986 Red Toyota 
4-Runner automobile. A trial was subsequently held before the 
Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby on January 25, 1990 at which time the 
court entered an order denying Plaintiff's request for forfeiture 
of the vehicle. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. At what point in time does the State obtain ownership 
of property used in violation of Utah Code Ann, §58-37-13 (1987, as 
amended). 
2. Can a third party obtain any interest in property 
that has been seized pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13 (1987, as 
amended). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(1) (1987, 
as amended), is determinative and is set forth as an addendum to 
this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A few days prior to January 6, 1989, David Nance, an 
agent with the Davis Metro Narcotics Task Force, received 
information from an agent with the Utah State Tax Commission that 
a 1986 Toyota 4-Runner had been seen bearing a license plate that 
was registered to a motorhome. (Trial transcript at page 5, 
hereinafter referred to as T. 5) 
On January 6, 1989, Agent Nance observed Mike Gartrell 
driving the Toyota 4-Runner (T. 6, line 6-9). 
Agent Nance, along with Agents Lon Brian and Agent 
Richard Bliss, responded to the home of Lori Taylor where they 
observed the Toyota 4-Runner in her driveway. Upon making contact 
with Miss Taylor she informed the agents that the vehicle belonged 
to Mike Gartrell. (T. 6-7) 
As the agents were leaving, Mike Gartrell arrived and 
when the agents spoke to him concerning the vehicle, he stated the 
Toyota 4-Runner was owned by his brother, Troy Gartrell. (T. 7-8) 
Agent Nance was aware that the Utah State Tax Commission 
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had a lien and execution for any property owned by Troy Gartrell. 
(T. 8-9) 
The agents then impounded the Toyota 4-Runner for 
improper registration and for the State Tax lien. (T. 9) 
An inventory search of the vehicle was conducted and 
illegal narcotics were found inside the vehicle. The vehicle was 
then seized pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(1) (1987, as 
amended). (T. 10-14) 
The items seized were processed by the Weber State Crime 
Lab and it was determined that the items did in fact contain 
cocaine. (T. 35-36) 
The following day, Agent Lon Brian received a phone call 
from Mike Gartrell who stated that he was mistaken and that the 
Toyota 4-Runner belonged to him and not to his brother, Troy 
Gartrell. (T. 42) 
Two or three days after the seizure took place, Agent 
Brian received a phone call and had contact with a Brad Jenkins who 
stated that he was in fact the owner of the Toyota 4-Runner. (T. 
51) 
On the 14th day of January, 1989, Constance Gartrell met 
with Brad Jenkins and purchased the Toyota 4-Runner from him for 
the sum of $9,000.00. (T. 71-72, T. 99-100) 
At the time of the purchase, she was given a bill of sale 
which specifically included the fact that the Toyota 4-Runner had 
been impounded and seized by the State of Utah and that it would be 
her responsibility to "retrieve it". (Exhibit 1) 
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That pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(1) (1987, as 
amended), a verified complaint seeking the forfeiture of the 1986 
Toyota 4-Runner was filed with the Second Judicial District Court 
and all parties know to the County Attorney's Office, who at one 
time claimed, or were implicated as having interest in the vehicle, 
were served with notice of the action. 
That the only interested party to answer the complaint 
was Constance Gartrell. All others including Mike Gartrell, Troy 
Gartrell, and Brad Jenkins failed to answer the complaint by the 
time period allowed by law, and as a result their default was 
entered. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Property that is used or intended for use in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13 (1987, as amended) is forfeitable to the 
State and title to said forfeitable property vests in the State at 
the time the illegal use occurs. This vesting precludes a 
subsequent transfer of the property or interest in said property to 
any person for any purpose. The property itself is tainted upon 
the commission of the illegal act and any transfer made thereafter 
is null and void. In addition, if the proven owner of seized 
property is properly notified of proceedings and fails to answer 
the verified complaint within the time frame allowed by law, the 
court shall order the release of the property to the petitioner 
entitled to receive it. Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(9)(f) (1987, as 
amended). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE STATE'S INTEREST IN THE VEHICLE VESTED AT 
THE TIME IT WAS USED IN VIOLATION OF THE 
FORFEITURE STATUTE. 
In the State of Utah, §58-37-13 Utah Code Ann. (1987, as 
amended) provides that certain items of property when used in 
violation of the Controlled Substance Act become forfeitable. 
Specifically, Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(1)(e) (1987, as amended) 
provides that: 
(1) The following are subject to forfeiture, 
and no property right exists in them: . . . 
(e) all conveyances including aircraft, 
vehicles, or vessels used or intended for use, 
to transport, or in any manner facilitate the 
transportation, sale, receipt, simple 
possession, or concealment of property 
described in Subsections (l)(a) or (l)(b). . . 
A forfeiture proceeding is a civil in rem action against 
an item of property which has been used in violation of the law and 
is based on the theory that the property itself has committed the 
offense and is guilty of the wrongdoing. United States vs. Nichols, 
841 F2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988); State vs. Nine Thousand One Hundred 
Ninety-Nine Dollars, 132 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (1990). 
Because of this taint upon the property, the courts have 
generally held that at that particular instant, all rights and 
legal title to the property pass to the government in seizure; 
formal proceedings simply confirm the forfeiture that has already 
taken place. In United States vs. One Hundred Barrels Distilled 
Spirits 81 U.S. at 56-57, 20 L.Ed 816-817, the court stated: 
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... [I]t must be admitted . . . beyond all doubt, 
that forfeiture becomes absolute at the 
commission of the prohibited actsf and that the 
title from that moment vests in the United 
States in all cases when the statute in terms 
denounces the forfeiture of the property as a 
penalty for a violation of law, without giving 
any alternative remedy, or prescribing any 
substitute for the forfeiture, or allowing any 
exceptions to its enforcement, or employing in 
the enactment any language showing a different 
intent... 
This presumption is now uniformly followed in every state and 
federal jurisdiction. Most recently, the Utah Court of Appeals had 
the opportunity to review and accept this presumption as well. In 
State vs. Nine Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars, 132 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 40 (1990), the Court stated: 
[N]o property right exists in property subject 
to forfeiture. This reference to property 
rights incorporates the rule that titles to 
forfeitable property vests in the State at the 
time a criminal act is committed. 
In the present case, the vehicle which is the subject of 
this action was seen being driven by Mike Gartrell on the 6th day 
of January, 1989. Shortly thereafter the vehicle was impounded and 
cocaine and drug paraphernalia were found in the vehicle. Clearly 
the vehicle had been used to transport, or to facilitate the 
transportation, sale, receipt, simple possession, or concealment of 
controlled substances in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-
13(1)(e) (1987, as amended). Therefore, in accordance with state 
statute, title to the vehicle vested in the State of Utah at the 
time of violation, that being January 6, 1989, when ownership of 
the vehicle was with Brad Jenkins. 
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POINT II. 
A THIRD PARTY CANNOT OBTAIN TITLE OR INTEREST 
TO PROPERTY AFTER IT HAS BEEN SEIZED BY THE 
STATE. 
If title to forfeitable property vests in the State at 
the time a criminal act occurs, then the next question is whether 
a third party can take or obtain any interest in said forfeitable 
property after it has been seized. Several federal cases have 
dealt with this issue and are in total agreement that a bona fide 
purchaser having no knowledge that the property is forfeitable, who 
pays for said property in an "arms length" transaction, does not 
acquire an interest in the property. The United States Supreme 
Court in United States vs. Stowell, 10 S.Ct. 244 (1890) at 247, 
stated: 
By the settled doctrine of this court, whenever 
a statute enacts that upon the commission of a 
certain act specific property used or connected 
with that act shall be forfeited, the 
forfeiture takes effect immediately...; and the 
condemnation, when obtained, relates back to 
the times and avoids all intermediate sales and 
alienation even to purchasers in good faith, 
(emphasis added) 
This holding appears to have been followed in most state and 
federal courts, see Simons vs. U.S. , 541 F2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1976); 
Florida Dealers and Growers Bank vs. U.S., 279 F2d 673 (5th Cir. 
1960); Wingo vs. U.S., 266 F2d 421 (5th Cir. 1959); 7 Fifths Old 
Grand Dad Whiskey vs. U.S., 158 F.2d 24 (10th Cir. 1946); U.S. vs. 
One 1954 Model Tudor Ford, 167 F.Supp. 864 (ED SC 1958); U.S. vs. 
One 1954 Model Ford Victoria, 135 F.Supp 809 (ED NC 1955); 
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State vs. Cherry, 387 S.W.2d 149 (TX App. 1965); and Weathersbee 
vs. U.S., 263 F.2d 323 (4th Cir. 1958). 
In following this line of reasoning, the Utah Court of 
Appeals in quoting from United States vs. $41,305.00 In Currency, 
802 F.2d 1339 (11th Cir. 1986), stated: 
Illegal use [of money] immediately vests title 
to the property in the sovereign, and cuts off 
the rights of third parties to obtain legally 
protectible interests in the property. State 
vs. Nine Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Nine 
Dollars, 132 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (1990). 
In the present case, the District Court held that the 
Toyota 4-Runner, which is the subject of this action, was properly 
seized and forfeitable to the State of Utah. Therefore, even if 
Constance Gartrell had purchased the Toyota 4-Runner in good faith, 
without knowledge that the vehicle had been seized, she could not 
have obtained any interest in that property. 
However, Constance Gartrell did not purchase the vehicle 
in good faith or without knowledge. At the time she purchased the 
vehicle from Brad Jenkins, she was told that the vehicle had been 
seized. The bill of sale, acknowledged by Constance Gartrell and 
dated January 14, 1989, specifically states that the Toyota 4-
Runner "was under impound and seizure by the State" and that she 
was receiving "total responsibility to retrieve [the vehicle]". 
Once a purchaser is put on notice that a transaction 
might be tainted and that the item to be purchased may not be free 
and clear of all liens, then said purchaser is required to make 
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further inquiry as to the status of the lien. In Myer vs. General 
American Corporation, 569 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1977), this Court stated 
that, 
. . . [Constructive notice is sufficient to 
defeat the purchaser's claim. Constructive 
notice can occur when circumstances arise that 
should put a reasonable person on guard so as 
to require further inquiry on his part. 
In it's ruling on the present case, the trial court 
stated that whether Constance Gartrell understood what a "seizure" 
was, she certainly understood it was both impounded and had been 
seized. 
Therefore, Ms. Gartrell was aware of the State's claim of 
interest in the vehicle, and with knowledge, a reasonable person 
would have been put on guard so as to make an inquiry into this 
claim. A simple phone call made prior to purchasing the vehicle 
would have revealed the facts surrounding the State's claim. 
However, such a phone call was not made until after the transaction 
was finalized between Constance Gartrell and Brad Jenkins. 
An additional factor to consider is the operative effect 
of the default by Brad Jenkins upon the claim of Constance 
Gartrell. A default is in essence an admission of the truth of all 
the material allegations of the complaint and as an admission of 
the cause of action. It is an admission that the plaintiff is 
entitled to judgment as prayed. 
The District Court, on September 5, 1989, entered default 
against Brad Jenkins, thus constituting an admission by Mr. Jenkins 
that the vehicle was used in violation of the Controlled Substance 
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Act as stated in the Verified Complaint and should properly be 
forfeited to the Davis Metro Narcotics Strike Force. Since Jenkins 
was the predecessor in interest to Mrs. Gartrell, this admission 
should serve to additionally taint any claim she might make to the 
vehicle. The admission in effect acknowledges that the illegal 
activity should require forfeiture of the vehicle. 
Therefore, Constance Gartrell was not, in fact, a good 
faith purchaser and pursuant to this Court's recent findings in 
State vs. Nine Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars, supra, 
could not obtain ownership or interest in the 1986 Toyota 4-Runner. 
CONCLUSION 
Property which has been used in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §58-37-13 (1987, as amended) is forfeitable and title to that 
property vests in the State of Utah at the moment the property is 
used in violation of the statute. Once the property has been used 
in violation of the statute and title has vested to the State, a 
third party cannot thereafter obtain ownership or interest in said 
property. Therefore, Constance Gartrell does not have any interest 
or ownership in the 1986 Toyota 4-Runner and said vehicle is 
forfeitable to the State of Utah. Appellant therefore prays that 
the 1986 Toyota 4-Runner be forfeited pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§58-37-13 (1987, as amended). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j& day of June, 1990. 
^ ^ ^ ^ r 
St&/(?h V. Maj6f ^ - - _ ^ _ 
Attorney for /Pla in t i f f /Appel lant 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Rule 3(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 
B. Utah Code Ann., §78-2-2(3)(j) (1953, as amended) 
C. Utah Code Ann., §58-37-13 (1987, as amended) et seq. 
D. Bill of Sale (Exhibit 1) 
E. District Court Order and Findings of Fact 
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A. Rule 3(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: How taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An 
appeal may be taken from a district court to the Supreme Court from 
all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by 
law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the district 
court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant 
to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal 
does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for 
such actions as the Supreme Court deems appropriate, which may 
included dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of 
dismissal, as well as the award of attorney's fees. 
B. Utah Code Ann., §78-2-2(3)(j) (1953, as amended) 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
• • • 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
• • • 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record 
over which the Court of Appeals does not have original 
appellate jurisdiction. 
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Utah Code Ann., §58-37-13 
58-37-13. Property subject to forfeiture — Seizure — Pro-
cedure. 
(1) The following are subject to forfeiture, and no property right exists in 
them: 
(a) all controlled substances which have been manufactured, distrib-
uted, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this act; 
(b) all raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind used, or 
intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, 
importing, or exporting any controlled substance in violation of this act; 
(c) all property used or intended for use as a container for property 
described in Subsections (l)(a) and (1Kb); 
(d) all hypodermic needles, syringes, and other paraphernalia, not in-
cluding capsules used with health food supplements and herbs, used or 
intended for use to administer controlled substances in violation of this 
act; 
(e) all conveyances including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels used or in-
tended for use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the transporta-
tion, sale, receipt, simple possession, or concealment of property described 
in Subsections (l)(a) or (1Kb), except that: 
(i) a conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the 
transaction of business as a common carrier may not be forfeited 
under this section unless it appears that the owner or other person in 
charge of the conveyance was a consenting party or privy to violation 
of this act; 
(ii) a conveyance may not be forfeited under this section by reason 
of any act or omission committed or omitted without the owner's 
knowledge or consent; and 
(iii) any forfeiture of a conveyance subject to a bona fide security 
interest is subject to the interest of a secured party who could not 
have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation 
would or did take place in the use of the conveyance; 
(f) all books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm, 
tapes, and data used or intended for use in violation of this act; 
(g) everything of value furnished or intended to be furnished in ex-
change for a controlled substance in violation of this act, all proceeds 
traceable to any violation of this act, and all moneys, negotiable instru-
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ments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any viola-
tion of this act: but: 
(i) An interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsec-
tion if the holder of the interest did not know of the act which made 
the property subject to forfeiture, or did not willingly consent to the 
act; 
(ii) There is a rebuttable presumption that all money, coins, and 
currency found in proximity to forfeitable controlled substances, drug 
manufacturing or distributing paraphernalia, or to forfeitable 
records of the importation, manufacture, or distribution of controlled 
substances are forfeitable under this section; the burden of proof is 
upon claimants of the property to rebut this presumption; 
(h) all imitation controlled substances as defined in the Imitation Con-
trolled Substances Act; and 
(i) all warehousing, housing, and storage facilities, or interest in real 
property of any kind used, or intended for use, in producing, cultivating, 
warehousing, storing, protecting, or manufacturing any controlled sub-
stances in violation of this chapter, except that: 
(i) any forfeiture of a housing, warehousing, or storage facility or 
interest in real property is subject to the bona fide security interest of 
a party who could not have known in the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence that a violation would take place on the property; 
(ii) an interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsec-
tion if the holder of the interest did not know of the act which made 
the property subject to forfeiture, or did not willingly consent to the 
act; 
(iii) unless the premises are used in producing, cultivating, or 
manufacturing controlled substances, a housing, warehousing, or 
storage facility or interest in real property may not be forfeited under 
this section unless cumulative sales of controlled substances on the 
property within a two-month period total or exceed $1,000, or the 
street value of any controlled substances found on the premises at 
any given time totals or exceeds $1,000. A narcotics officer experi-
enced in controlled substances law enforcement may testify to estab-
lish the street value of the controlled substances for purposes of this 
subsection. 
(2) Property subject to forfeiture under this act may be seized by any peace 
officer of this state upon process issued by any court having jurisdiction over 
the property. However, seizure without process may be made when: 
(a) the seizure is incident to an arrest or search under a search warrant 
or an inspection under an administrative inspection warrant; 
(b) the property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judg-
ment in favor of the state in a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding 
under this act; 
(c) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property is 
directly or indirectly dangerous to health or safety; or 
(d) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property has 
been used or intended to be used in violation of this act. 
(3) In the event of seizure under Subsection (2), proceedings under Subsec-
tion (4) shall be instituted promptly. 
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(4) Property taken or detained under this section is not repleviable but is in 
custody of the law enforcement agency making the seizure, subject only to the 
orders and decrees of the court or the official having jurisdiction. When prop-
erty is seized under this act the appropriate person or agency may: 
(a) place the property under seal; 
(b) remove the property to a place designated by it or the warrant 
under which it was seized; or 
(c) take custody of the property and remove it to an appropriate loca-
tion for disposition in accordance with law. 
(5) All substances listed in Schedule I that are possessed, transferred, dis-
tributed, or offered for distribution in violation of this act are contraband and 
shall be seized and summarily forfeited to the state. Similarly, all substances 
listed in Schedule I which are seized or come into the possession of the state 
are contraband and shall be summarily forfeited to the state if the owners are 
unknown. 
(6) All species of plants from which controlled substances in Schedules I 
and II are derived which have been planted or cultivated in violation of this 
act, or of which the owners or cultivators are unknown, or are wild growths, 
may be seized and summarily forfeited to the state. 
(7) Failure, upon demand by the department or its authorized agent, of any 
person in occupancy or in control of land or premises upon which species of 
plants are growing or being stored, to produce an appropriate license or proof 
that he is the holder of a license, is authority for the seizure and forfeiture of 
the plants. 
(8) When any property is forfeited under this act by a finding of the court 
that no person is entitled to recover the property, it shall be deposited in the 
custody of the Division of Finance. Disposition of all property is as follows: 
(a) The state may include in its complaint seeking forfeiture, a request 
that the seizing agency be awarded the property. Upon a finding that the 
seizing agency is able to use the forfeited property in the enforcement of 
controlled substances laws, the district court having jurisdiction over the 
case shall award the property to the seizing agency. The seizing agency 
shall pay to the prosecuting agency the legal costs incurred in filing and 
pursuing the forfeiture action. Property forfeited under this section may 
not be applied by the court to costs or fines assessed against any defen-
dant in the case. 
(b) The seizing agency, or if it makes no application, any state agency, 
bureau, county, or municipality, which demonstrates a need for specific 
property or classes of property subject to forfeiture shall be given the 
property for use in enforcement of controlled substances laws upon the 
payment of costs to the county attorney for legal costs for filing and 
pursuing the forfeiture and upon application for the property to the direc-
tor of the Division of Finance. The application shall clearly set forth the 
need for the property and the use to which the property will be put. 
(c) The director of the Division of Finance shall review all applications 
for property submitted under Subsection (8Kb) and, if the seizing agency 
makes no application, make a determination based on necessity and ad-
visability as to final disposition and shall notify the designated applicant 
or seizing agency, where no application is made, who may obtain the 
property upon payment of all costs to the appropriate department. The 
Division of Finance shall in turn reimburse the prosecuting agency or 
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agencies for costs of filing and pursuing the forfeiture action, not to ex-
ceed the amount of the net proceeds received for the sale of the property. 
Any proceeds remaining after payment shall be returned to the seizing 
agency or agencies. 
(d) If no disposition is made upon an application under Subsection 
(8)(a) or (b), the director of the Division of Finance shall dispose of the 
property by public bidding or where deemed appropriate, by destruction. 
Proof of destruction shall be upon oath of two officers or employees of the 
department having charge of the property, and verified by the director of 
the department or his designated agent. 
(9) When any property is subject to forfeiture, a determination for forfeiture 
to the state shall be made as follows: 
(a) A complaint verified on oath or affirmation shall be prepared by the 
county attorney where the property was seized or is to be seized and filed 
in the district court. The complaint shall describe with reasonable partic-
ularity: 
(i) the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding; 
(ii) the date and place of seizure, if known; and 
(iii) the allegations which constitute a basis for forfeiture. 
(b) Upon filing the complaint, the clerk of the district court shall forth-
with issue a warrant for seizure of the property which is the subject 
matter of the action and deliver it to the sheriff for service, unless the 
property has previously been seized without a warrant, under Subsection 
58-37-13(2). 
(c) Notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture shall be filed with the 
county clerk, and served together with a copy of the complaint, upon all 
persons known to the county attorney to have a claim in the property by 
one of the following methods: 
(i) upon each claimant whose name and address is known, at the 
last known address of the claimant, or upon each owner whose right, 
title, or interest is of record in the Division of Motor Vehicles, by 
mailing a copy of the notice and complaint by certified mail to the 
address given upon the records of the division, which service is 
deemed complete even though the mail is refused or cannot be for-
warded; and 
(ii) upon all other claimants whose addresses are unknown, but 
who are believed to have an interest in the property, by one publica-
tion in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the 
seizure was made. 
(d) Except under Subsection (8)(c), any claimant or interested party 
shall file with the court a verified answer to the complaint within 20 days 
after service has been obtained. 
(e) When property is seized under this act, any interested person or 
claimant of the property, prior to being served with a complaint under 
this section, may file a petition in the district court for release of his 
interest in the property. The petition shall specify the claimant's interest 
in the property and his right to have it released. A copy shall be served 
upon the county attorney in the county of the seizure, who shall answer 
the petition within 20 days. A petitioner need not answer a complaint of 
forfeiture. 
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(f) After 20 days following service of a complaint or petition for release, 
the court shall examine the record and if no answer is on file, the court 
shall allow the complainant or petitioner an opportunity to present evi-
dence in support of his claim and order forfeiture or release of the prop-
erty as the court determines. If the county attorney has not filed an 
answer to a petition for release and the court determines from the evi-
dence that the petitioner is not entitled to recovery of the property, it 
shall enter an order directing the county attorney to answer the petition 
within ten days. If no answer is filed within that period, the court shall 
order the release of the property to the petitioner entitled to receive it. 
(g) When an answer to a complaint or petition appears of record at the 
end of 20 days, the court shall set the matter for hearing within 20 days. 
At this hearing all interested parties may present evidence of their rights 
of release of the property following the state's evidence for forfeiture. The 
court shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence the issues in the 
case and order forfeiture or release of the property as it determines. 
(h) Proceedings of this section are independent of any other proceed-
ings, whether civil or criminal, under this act or the laws of this state, 
(i) When the court determines that claimants have no right in the 
property in whole or in part, it shall declare the property to be forfeited 
and direct it to be delivered to the custody of the Division of Finance. The 
division shall dispose of the property under Subsection (8). 
(j) When the court determines that property, in whole or in part, is not 
subject to forfeiture, it shall order release of the property to the proper 
claimant. If the court determines that the property is subject to forfeiture 
and release in part, it shall order partial release and partial forfeiture. 
When the property cannot be divided for partial forfeiture and release, 
the court shall order it sold and the proceeds distributed: 
(i) first, proportionally among the legitimate claimants; 
(ii) second, to defray the costs of the action, including seizure, stor-
age of the property, legal costs of filing and pursuing the forfeiture, 
and costs of sale; and 
(iii) third, to the Division of Finance for the General Fund. 
(k) In a proceeding under this section where forfeiture is declared, in 
whole or in part, the court shall assess all costs of the forfeiture proceed-
ing, including seizure and storage of the property, against the individual 
or individuals whose conduct was the basis of the forfeiture, and may 
assess costs against any other claimant or claimants to the property as 
appropriate. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 13; 1982, ch. act" means Laws 1971, ch 145. which enacted 
12, § 2; 1982, ch. 32, § 9; 1987, ch. 87, § 2. this chapter 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- Imitation Controlled Substances Act — 
ment, effective July 1, 1987, rewrote this sec- The Imitation Controlled Substances Act, re-
tion to the extent that a detailed analysis is ferTed to in Subsection ilxh), appears as 
impracticable
 w 58-37b-l to 58-37b-8 
Meaning of "this act" —- The term this 
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E. District Court Judgment, 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
DAVID PAUL WHITE (3441) 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
144 SOUTH 500 EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84102 
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-8288 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
1986 RED TOYOTA 4-RUNNER, 
BEARING VIN JT4RN6203G0057623 ] 
Defendant. ] 
i JUDGMENT 
i Case No. 45023 
i Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
Trial was held in above-entitled action before the Honorable 
Douglas L. Cornaby on January 25, 1990. State of Utah was present 
and represented by Steve Majors; Defendant/Claimant, Constance 
Gartrell was present and represented by her counsel, David Paul 
White. The Court having heard all of the evidence produced and 
having considered documentation entered into evidence, now makes 
the following ORDER: 
Said vehicle being 1986 Toyota 4-Runner bearing VIN 
JT4RN6203G0057623 cannot be forfeited by the State of Utah and is 
ordered returned to Constance Gartrell. 
DATED this day of , 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
Douglas L. Cornaby 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
15 
Steve Majors 
DAVID PAUL WHITE (3441) 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
144 SOUTH 500 EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84102 
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-8288 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
1986 RED TOYOTA 4-RUNNER, 
BEARING VIN JT4RN6203G0057623 
Defendant. 
1 FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
> CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Case No. 45023 
i Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
COMES NOW, the above-entitled Defendant, by and through its 
counsel, David Paul White, and files the following Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. The vehicle in question was properly seized and impounded 
on January 6, 1989, because of improper registration and operator 
was driving on suspended license. 
2. Vehicle properly searched pursuant to impound on January 
14, 1989. Constance Gartrell made lawful purchase of said vehicle 
from previous owner, Brad Jenkins. 
3. State's notice of its intent to seize and forfeite was 
mailed to Constance Gartrell on January 16, 1989. 
4. Complaint for forfeiture filed on January 16, 1989. 
Constance Gartrell answered said Complaint as a Claimant and 
interested party on said vehicle and trial on said Complaint was 
held before the above-entitled Court on January 25, 1990. On the 
foregoing findings of fact, the Court now makes the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Said vehicle was properly seized and impounded. 
2. Inventory search of said vehicle was done properly and in 
the regular course of police officer procedure. 
3. Constance Gartrell was an innocent purchaser of said 
vehicle. 
4. State of Utah cannot forfeiture said vehicle and said 
vehicle must be returned to Constance Gartrell. 
DATED this day of Febraury, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
Douglas L. Cornaby 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Steve Majors 
Deputy Davis County Attorney 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
STEVEN V. MAJOR, being duly sworn, states that he is the 
attorney for Appellant State of Utah and that he served four (4) 
copies of the Brief of Appellant State of Utah upon: 
David Paul White 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
144 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City UT 84119 
AND 
that he did serve ten (10) copies of the Brief of Appellant State 
of Utah upon: 
Clerk of the Supreme Court 
332 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City UT 84114 
by personally delivering true copies thereof, on the ^?3 day of 
June, 1990. 
feVEN V. MAJQg^ 
Deputy Davis County Attorney 
Attorney for Appellant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^o> day of June, 1990, 
bi^fefe 
tiOTARY PUBLIC 
" - ' T State 
~'ngion. Utah 84025 
*~ "" ' Commission Expires 
y^^^j/^/ December 13.1992 
^ S ^ STATEOPUTAH 
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